Sandia Energy > Programs > Nuclear Energy > Safety, Safeguards, and Informed Security Design > Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security The Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program area in the Department of Energy, Nuclear Energy (DOE NE) seeks to support domestic deployment of advanced nuclear reactors by mitigating safeguards and security roadblocks. The program applies laboratory research and development to address near-term challenges advanced reactor vendors face in meeting Physical Protection System (PPS), Material Control and Accounting (MC&A), and Cybersecurity requirements for U.S. construction. Helpful Links Learn more about the various ways DOE NE is supporting the nuclear industryLearn more about resources for international safeguards and security support for advanced reactors.Learn more about Sandia safety, security, and safeguards (3S) for advanced nuclear power Key Thrust Areas Develop Robust and Cost-Appropriate Physical Protection Systems Security costs for nuclear reactors can be prohibitive. The ARSS program is examining alternative PPS approaches that may drastically reduce the expenses associated with security. New technologies for detection, delay, and response are being actively developed and tested. These can be used alongside the security-by-design principles to optimize a PPS. The interface between security and safety plays an important role in advanced reactors and may allow for a more efficient PPS. The ARSS program is also supporting deployment of university research reactors and MC&A or PPS requirements. New Security Concepts for Advanced ReactorsDeliberate Motion AnalyticsU.S. Domestic Microreactor Security-by-DesignU.S. Domestic Pebble Bed Reactor: Security-by-DesignU.S. Domestic Small Modular Reactor Security by DesignPhysical Security Timeline Analysis in Support of Advanced Reactor Demonstration and Deployment Evaluate Material Control and Accounting Approaches for Pebble Bed Reactors Some advanced reactor designs utilize alternative fuel forms, such as pebble-based fuel. Pebble Bed Reactors (PBRs) present a unique MC&A challenge in that tracking and counting the vast number of pebbles may be difficult for existing technologies and approaches. The ARSS program is examining each aspect of the PBR design from a safeguards perspective, including the MC&A approach, pebble handling systems, burnup measurements, and the interface between physical protection and MC&A. Nuclear Material Control & Accounting for Pebble Bed Reactors – FY23 Summary ReportUse Machine Learning to Improve Burnup Measurement in Pebble Bed Reactors – FY23NDA of TRISCO Fuels – FY23Nuclear Material Control and Accountancy Approach for Pebble Fueled Reactors using a Novel Pebble-Type Identification and Classification TechnologyPebble Bed Reactor Domestic Safeguards – FY21 Summary Report Evaluate Material Control and Accounting Approaches for Molten Salt Reactors Liquid-fueled molten salt reactors (MSRs) are singularly unique advanced reactor designs in that the fuel itself is in bulk form, as opposed to being discrete items (such as pebbles or fuel assemblies). The ARSS program is examining an overall MC&A approach, as well as exploring new measurement technologies and statistical methods to meet regulatory requirements. Planning for Material Control and Accounting at Liquid-Fuel Molten Salt ReactorsAssessment of Flow Enhanced Electrochemical Sensor Testing and Deployments for Molten Salt ReactorsTesting Application of Optical Techniques to Advanced Salt SystemsMaterial Accountancy for Molten Salt Reactors Challenges and OpportunitiesExperimental Validation of Nondestructive Assay Capabilities for Molten Salt Reactor Safeguards – FY21 ReportOn-line Monitoring for Molten Salt Reactor MC&A: Optical Spectroscopy-Based ApproachesMC&A for MSRs: FY2021 Report Cybersecurity The ARSS program sponsors cross-cutting R&D to enable the use of advanced digital technologies for advanced reactors and current U.S. nuclear fleet. This program aims to adapt the best cybersecurity discoveries and practices from other sectors to the rigorous needs of nuclear power applications and to address any unique challenges not being addressed elsewhere, especially where these can enable innovative nuclear power use cases. Cybersecurity by Design Digital Engineering and Cybersecurity Decision Analysis in Early Phases of SMR-Driven IES ProjectsSystem-Level Design Analysis for Advanced Reactor Cybersecurity Cyber-Informed Engineering for Nuclear Reactor Digital Instrumentation and ControlSurvey of Cyber Risk Analysis Techniques for Use in the Nuclear IndustryCyber-Physical Risks for Advanced ReactorsTowards a New Supply Chain Cybersecurity Risk Analysis Technique Cyber Technology Evaluation and Demonstration A System Monitoring Architecture for Supply-Chain Attack MitigationRemote Operations and Monitoring: Attack Surfaces Security Evaluation of Smart Cards and Secure Tokens: Benefits and Drawbacks for Reducing Supply Chain Risks of Nuclear Power Plants Consider International Safeguards and Security Requirements Many advanced reactor vendors also consider international safeguards and security when designing their facility, in anticipation of international deployment. While focused on domestic safeguards, the ARSS program partners with NNSA to support vendors with global aspirations. Advanced Reactor Safeguards: Lessons from the IAEA Safeguards DomainThe Nexus site provides resources for international safeguards and security support for advanced reactors. Validation of ARSS Research through Vendor Engagements The ARSS program provides direct support to vendors to assist in developing MC&A and PPS approaches for their facilities. This work examines design-specific challenges associated with advanced reactors and generates creative solutions early in the development phase. Some engagements are in partnership with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) through the NEXUS portal. Lessons learned from this work are available to all vendors, to promote knowledge-sharing in a growing industry. Fall 2023 ARSS Program Review Presentations Physical Protection Systems Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security Program Overview and GoalsSecurity Staffing RequirementsSecurity Systems of the FuturePhysics-Based Sabotage of Advanced Reactor ConceptsPreliminary University Advanced Reactor AssessmentSafeguards and Security for Nuclear Maritime ApplicationsEnhanced Delay Technologies Risk-Informed Consequence-Driven Physical Protection System Optimization for Microreactor SitesImplementation of Task Variance Model in Security Assessment Models Cybersecurity Model Based Systems EngineeringSystem Level Design AnalysisAdvanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development EnvironmentInformation Protection in Nuclear SystemsNuclear System Remote Operations Attack SurfacesQuantum-based Secure Communication for Remote OperationsCybersecurity in Advanced Reactor Fleet by Cyber-Informed DesignAdvanced Reactor Wireless CommunicationsSecure Element ReviewAnalysis of Control System Variants, Advanced Sensors, and Instrumentation Machine Learning Applications Material Control and Accounting MC&A for Pebbles Bed ReactorsUsing Machine Learning to Improve Efficiency and Accuracy of Burnup Measurements at PBR ReactorsTRISO NDA Measurements for BurnupPebble Database for PBR MC&AMC&A Recommendations for Molten Salt ReactorsMolten Salt Reactor Safeguards ModelingProcess Monitoring for MC&A Optical Spectroscopy Flow Enhanced Sensors Total Mass Accountability in Advanced Liquid-Fueled ReactorsAn Integrated Elemental and Isotopic Detector for Realtime Molten Salt MonitoringDevelopment of A Thin-Layer Electrochemical Sensor for Molten Salt Reactors and Fuel Cycle Processes Gen-IV PR&PP International Interfaces Contact Ben Cipiti, National Technical Director Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security Program Sandia National Laboratories (505) 284-8757 Katya Le Blanc, Deputy National Technical Director Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security Program Idaho National Laboratory Dan Warner, Federal Program Manager Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security Program Department of Nuclear Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy