



Quantum-based Secure Communications for Remote Operations NEUP Project 21-24354

2024 ARSS Spring Program Review

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> May 2024 West Lafayette, IN

Team Info

Purdue

- Stylianos Chatzidakis (Assistant Professor and Associate Reactor Director, SRO)
- True Miller (Reactor supervisor, SRO)
- Brian Jowers (Electronics/I&C reactor staff, RO)
- K. Gkouliaras, V. Theos, Z. Dahm, K. Vasili, W. Richards, R. Ughade (Grad students)

Collaborators

- Robert Ammon (Curtiss-Wright)
- Phil Evans (ORNL)
- Terry Cronin (Toshiba)
- NTD: Katya Le Blanc (INL) and Ben Cipiti (Sandia)










TOSHIBA



New technologies...new challenges



New reactor concepts => Significantly different requirements than existing fuel cycle facilities Digitalization => New architectures and new vulnerabilities New technologies => Quantum computing Adversaries now have access to new tools with unprecedent capabilities





What about Cybersecurity?






RADIATION IMAGING AND NUCLEAR SENSING

What about Cybersecurity?



Energy sector high on target list



NEWS ANALYSIS

Pipeline Attack Yields Urgent Lessons About U.S. Cybersecurity

The hack underscored how vulnerable government and industry are to even basic assaults on computer networks.

Oak Ridge National Lab shuts down Internet, email after cyberattack

DOE laboratory says it was victim of an Advanced Persistent Threat designed to steal

DIVE BRIEF

Published March 23, 2022

FBI: US energy sector faces 'reconnaissance, scanning' by Russian hackers; 5 companies targeted





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Problem Statement

Conventional encryption and IT solutions do not guarantee security for nuclear communications

How can we design an unconditional security framework to fulfil cyber requirements?





Goals & Objectives

Goal: Experimentally and numerically investigate quantum-based secure communications and demonstrate under prototypic conditions in PUR-1.

Objectives:

- 1. Develop a robust quantum communication modeling and simulation framework to support the analysis of QKD systems (completed)
- 2. Develop a cyber physical testbed with remote monitoring and communications in PUR-1 (completed)
- 3. Perform testing with prototypic QKD equipment and evaluate performance with and without cyber events (in progress)





Quantum Key Distribution Guarantees Confidentiality


True Random Number Generator Number Generator Key bit k_i Key distribution method





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
Quantum Key Distribution Provides Detection of Adversary








How it works



How it works



Send photons \rightarrow Measure QBER \rightarrow Higher QBER \rightarrow Lower Security


$$SKR = \frac{final \ secret \ key \ length}{sifted \ key \ length} \qquad QBER = q_e(1 - q_{ch}) + (1 - q_e)q_{ch} = \frac{\varepsilon}{4} + \frac{2q}{3}(2 - \varepsilon)$$

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Quantum "Wars"

Network	Year	Longest link	SKR
DARPA [100]	2004	29.8 km	10kbps
Beijing Metropolitan Network [101]	2007	42.6 km	-
Vienna Metropolitan Network [102]	2008	85 km	17kbps
SwissQuantum [103]	2009	17.1 km	2.4kbps
Tokyo [104]	2010	45 km	304kbps
Shangai [105]	2016	19.92 km	10kbps
Madrid [106]	2018	26.4 km	$70 \mathrm{kbps}$
Cambridge Metropolitan Network [107]	2019	10.6 km	2.58Mbps
Bristol Metropolitan Network [108]	2019	2.7 km	3.17kbps
Xiran/Guangzhou Metropolitan Link [109]	2019	30.02 km	$7.57 \mathrm{kbps}$






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
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ABOBATO



Modeling and Simulation





BB84 simulation (optical fiber and free space)

Equipment imperfections (source, channel, detector)

Bit strings from True Random Number Generator (TRNG)

Two-terminal /Single terminal execution

Modular design approach

Advanced customization of multiple input parameters

Evaluation and export of various performance metrics




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
NuQKD is now benchmarked and fully operational

Parameter GUI weak_pulse_source Port (Four-digit Integer): 1234 iterations (Integer): 100 research 🗸 eve keys (List of Integers, comma-separated): 5,10,15 Mu (Float): 0.189 random_attacks ir (Three position array, integer): 1 2 3 f_source (Float): 1.0 12 10 sr (Three position array, integer): 2 a (Float): 0.2 p_array (Three position array, float): 0.0 0.03 0.01 I (Float): 1.27 a_receiver (Float): 0.0 Exports: show_plots heta (Float): 0.4 spreadsheet_export tau (Float): 50.0 txt_exports • • • cgouliaras — client_NuQKD.py — 64×24 Run Script 60 + Sifted rate Mean Value μ = 16.678 kbps ob Base : 010100110011000 50 $\mu \pm \sigma, \sigma = 7.827$ kbps Experimental result= 16.5 kbps his is check fake data 15 55 (sdqy) xchange of bases: lice Bases Received 101010000001110 Sifted key (ifted Key (Bob Side): 00111 eceived Alice's shared bits: 011 0 -Base 200 400 800 1000 600 Iteration 15 AND NUCLEAR SENSING School of Nuclear Engineering LABORATORY UNIVERSITY

Parametric Analysis



Reactor reference scenario



Required Bandwidth

- PUR-1 data used as case study
- OT signals
 - 1 Hz sampling
 - 6-digit accuracy
- Min and max values recorded:
 - Over 24 hours of operation
 - Including transients and outliers

Diode	Distance (km)	Туре	Signals transmitted	Bandwidth Custom BCD (kbps)	Bandwidth IEEE-754 (kbps)
1	100	Two-way	67	0.533	2.144
2	1	One-way	2,000	16	64
3	10	Two-way	10	0.08	0.32



64 kbps required to transmit all 2,000 signals




Key rate vs. distance

Parameter	Value	
Source Repetition rate	1 MHz & 2 MHz	
Pulse μ	$\mu = 0.189$	
Detector efficiency	0.5	
Dead Time	50 ns	
Depolarization	5%	
Attenuation (channel)	0.2 dB/km	
Wavelength	1550 nm SMF	

Reliable communication up to 75 km with standard equipment and BB84


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Signal Prioritization


Connections	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability	
Field devices to Controller	Low	High	High	
Controller to Local Workstation	High	High	High	
Controller to Data Storage	High	High	Medium	
Local Workstation to Data	High	High	Low	
Storage	ingn	ingn	LOW	
UPS to Controller	Low	High	Low	
Field Workstation to Field	Medium	High	Medium	1
Devices	Weddulli	ingn	Medium	1
Field Workstation to Controller	Medium	High	Medium	
Controller to Server	High	High	Medium	
Server to Operations	High	High	High	
Server to Remote Workstation	High	High	Low	
Server to Data Storage	High	High	Low	








Introducing PUR-1








Before and after...



AND NUCLE




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
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



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
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LABORATOR






Installing and Testing AMDR



Digital/Cyber Remote Station



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Instrumentation & Control

- Instrumentation
 - 4 neutron detectors (FC, UIC, CIC) => cps, % power, change rate
 - 3 radiation area monitors (mR/hr)
 - 1 air monitor (Ci/m3)
 - Water chemistry (oC, μS/cm), confinement pressure (kPa)
- Control
 - RTP 3000, Ethernet-TCP/IP communications
 - R-Time (sampling rate up to 1 kHz)
- Archived data (process, network, and host)
 - All instruments, operator actions, alarms, shim and reg rod positions, source position, HVAC, magnet, pump current/voltage, etc.
 - PLC, UPS (battery status, freq, V, A), and system diagnostics
 - Network traffic (bandwidth, packet analysis, etc.)
 - Engineering workstation host system processes



Normal and Abnormal States


• Normal operation/state

- Startup procedure
- Any power level up to 100% (up to 2% change rate per supervisor guidance)
- Irradiations
- Shutdown by gang lower or SCRAM
- Multiple operators
- Simulated abnormal states (tentative)
 - Power excursion (ramp up > 2%, alarm @6%), modify critical rod positions, etc.
 - Oscillations (e.g., equipment degradation), unusual power levels
 - Equipment on/off (pump, HVAC, temperature increase)
 - Cyber
 - Eavesdropping (e.g., process and operation data)
 - Data exfiltration (e.g., Monju type attack, steal host system data)
 - DoS (e.g., Davis-Besse, Browns-Ferry)
 - False data injection (e.g., Stuxnet type replay attack, data tampering)
 - Multiple scenarios (e.g., DoS for distraction+replay attack+oscillations)





Datasets for Benchmarking







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
ROD-POSITION



DoS and FDI




Data Artifacts





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Remote Monitoring System Fully Operational





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Future Steps



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Demo in Prototypic Conditions




Quantum Key Distribution


The new age of secure communication, powered by quantum physics

https://www.global.toshiba/ww/productssolutions/security-ict/qkd/products.html#4





Threat Analysis





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Conclusions

Explored potential of addressing nuclear I&C confidentiality requirements with QKD

Developed novel simulation tool (NuQKD) offering unique features

Constructed reference reactor scenario inspired from modern designs

Cyber-physical testbed installed and operational

More than 2000 OT and IT signals including real-time cyber events

Preliminary results are promising, justify further real-world experimentation





Publications (1/2)

Journal papers

- i. Konstantinos Gkouliaras, Vasileios Theos, William Richards, Zachery Dahm, and Stylianos Chatzidakis (2023). "Exploring the Feasibility of Quantumbased Secure Communications for Nuclear Applications." Submitted for publication to IEEE Quantum Science and Engineering journal.
- ii. Konstantinos Gkouliaras, Vasileios Theos, William Richards, Zachery Dahm, and Stylianos Chatzidakis (2023). "NuQKD: A Modular Quantum Key Distribution Simulation Framework for Engineering Applications." Submitted for publication to Advanced Quantum Science and Technology journal.

Theses

- i. Vasileios Theos (2023). "Design and Development of a Real-time Cyberphysical Testbed for Cybersecurity Research." MS Thesis, School of Nuclear Engineering, Purdue University.
- ii. William Richards (2023). "Developing Universal AI/ML Benchmarks for Nuclear Applications." MS Thesis, School of Nuclear Engineering, Purdue University.
- iii. Konstantinos Gkouliaras (2023). "Investigating the Feasibility of Quantum Key Distribution for Nuclear Reactor Communications." MS Thesis, School of Nuclear Engineering, Purdue University.





The nuclear industry is embarking on a transformation that will result in a more reliable and efficient new generation of advanced reactors, the success of which



Publications (2/2)

Conference papers

- i. Konstantinos Gkouliaras, Vasileios Theos, Philip G. Evans, Stylianos Chatzidakis (2023). "Simulating Quantum Key Distribution for Nuclear Reactor Communications with NuQKD." Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, November 12–15, 2023, Volume 129, accepted.
- ii. Vasileios Theos, Konstantinos Gkouliaras, True Miller, Brian Jowers, Stylianos Chatzidakis (2023). "Towards a Cyber-Physical Testbed for Cybersecurity Research in Nuclear Environments." Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, November 12–15, 2023, Volume 129, accepted.
- iii. Konstantinos Gkouliaras, Vasileios Theos, Reshma Ughade and Stylianos Chatzidakis (2022). "NuQKD: Development of a QKD simulation tool for nuclear reactor communications." Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, November 13–17, 2022, Volume 129, accepted.
- iv. Vasileios Theos, Konstantinos Gkouliaras, Zachery Dahm, True Miller, Brian Jowers, Stylianos Chatzidakis (2023). "A Physical Testbed for Nuclear Cybersecurity Research." Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, June 11–14, 2023, Volume 128, pp. 175–178.
- Vasileios Theos, Konstantinos Gkouliaras, True Miller, Brian Jowers, Ryan Smith and Stylianos Chatzidakis (2022). "Development of A Quantum-Based Cyber-Physical Testbed For Secure Communications In Nuclear Reactor Environments." Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, November 13–17, 2022, Volume 127, accepted.
- vi. Konstantinos Gkouliaras and Stylianos Chatzidakis (2022). "Evaluation of a QKD Network Structure Suitable for Secure Communications for Advanced Nuclear Reactors." Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, June 12–16, 2022, Volume 126, pp. 188–191.
- vii. Stylianos Chatzidakis and Robert Ammon (2021). "Using the PUR-1 Research Reactor to Explore Quantum Key Distribution for Nuclear I&C Cybersecurity." Abstract in Meeting Archives of the 2021 Test, Research and Training Reactors (TRTR) Annual Conference, October 18-21, 2021.



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Acknowledgements

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Questions?

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